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“RESTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM”
IN EQUITABLE RESCISSION*
D. Leslie Smithy 
Introduction
This essay deals with the meaning given the term “restitutio in 
integrum” in applying the equitable remedy o f rescission1 in Eng­
land and Canada. A court o f equity can grant rescission on several 
distinct grounds including fraud, innocent m isrepresentation, mis­
take, substantial misdescription or nondisclosure in contracts 
uberrimae fidei2. This paper is generally restricted to misrepresenta­
tion, fraudulent or innocent. Discussion will be divided into two 
parts: (1) the law in England and (2) the law in C anada.
The Law in England
Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
A contract induced by a fraudulent m isrepresentation is, in 
general, voidable.3 This broad statem ent is, o f course, subject to 
reservations. If  the contract has been affirmed after the misrep­
resentation has been discovered, the defrauded party will have no 
right to rescind.4 Since we are here concerned with equitable res­
cission, all equitable defences (such as laches5 or the acquiring by 
an  innocent purchaser for value of rights that would be adversely 
affected by rescission)6 are available to the defendant. Even if such
* This essay was prepared for the seminar on Restitution.
X D. Leslie Smith, II Law, U .N.B.
1 It has been said that this is not really a remedy at all. The reason is that 
a party defrauded has a right to avoid the contract on the basis o f fraud 
and the court merely declares that the case provides a situation that gives 
him that right: McDonnell and Munroe, Kerr on the Law o f  Fraud and 
M istake  (7th ed., 1952), p. 570. This view seems to be supported by the 
House o f Lords in Reese River Silver Mining Co. v. Smith (1869), L.R. 
4 H.L. 64. The proposition is definitely supported by Lord Atkinson in 
Abram Steamship Company v. Westvitle Shipping Company, [1923] A.C. 
773, at p. 781. However, rescission is normally spoken o f as a remedy 
and that usage will be adopted in this paper.
2 G. W. Keeton, An Introduction to Equity (4th ed., 1956), p. 342.
3 See Clarke v. Dickson (1858), El. Bl. & El. 148, at p. 154; 120 E.R. 463 
at p. 466 (K.B.) and Houldsworth v. City o f  Glasgow Bank (1880), 5 App. 
Cas. 317, at p. 338 for particular examples o f the acceptance o f this doctrine.
4 See, for example, Senanayake v. Cheng, [1966] A.C. 63, at p. 79 (P.C.).
5 Discussed as a valid defence, but rejected on the facts in Erlanger v. The 
New Sombrere Phosphate Co. (1878), 3 App. Cas. 1218 (H.L.), and in 
Lindsay Petroleum  v. Hurd (1874), L.R. 5 P.C. 221.
6 See Clough v. The London and Northwestern Railway Company (1871), 
L.R., 7 Ex. 26, at p. 35 (Ex. Ch.), per Mellor, J. Bankruptcy o f the frauludent 
party is probably not a bar: Re East gate. Ex Parte Ward, [1905] 1 K.B. 
465; Tilley v. Bowman, [1910] 1 K.B. 745 (both judgments o f single judges).
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norm al equitable defences are not available, the requirement o f 
restitutio in integrum remains. This was authoritatively7 set out in 
Clarke v. Dickson, a case at com m on law, by C rom pton J. :8
When once it is settled that a contract induced by fraud is not 
void, but voidable at the option o f the party defrauded, . . .  when that 
party exercises his option to rescind the contract, he must be in a 
state to rescind; that is, he must be in such a situation as to be able 
to put the parties into their original state before the contract.
This requirement o f restoring the parties to their original position 
has since been “ explained” as meaning restoration in regard to 
rights and obligations that are some part o f what was “contracted 
for” .9 Thus where a man bought a car, drove it to his place o f 
business and then resold it by way o f trade, he was able to rescind 
without any problem s o f restitution when it turned out that the car 
had been stolen and, as a result, was taken back by its true ow ner.10 
The court held that he had contracted to get title, so the benefit 
he had received by possession and resale did not have to be returned 
in order to restore the statu quo ante.n
The requirement of restitutio in integrum, as a prerequisite to 
rescission, was accepted as applying to a court o f equity, as well 
as one o f com m on law, by Lord Blackburn in Erlanger v. The New 
Sombrero Phosphate Company.12 It was a doctrine, he said, that had 
been “ acted upon both at law and in equity” ,13 but that a difference 
was apparent between those courts in its application—a difference 
arising out o f the different machinery available to the courts. He 
went on to say:
. . .  a Court o f Equity could not give damages, and, unless it 
can rescind the contract, can give no relief. And, on the other hand, 
it can take accounts o f profits and make allowances for deterioration.
7 This case was accepted, as stating the common law position, by Urqidiart 
v. MacPherson (1873), 3 App. Cas. 831, at p. 838 (P.C.), and by Lord 
Blackburn in the House o f Lords in Erlanger v. The New Sombrero Phosphate 
Co. (1878), 3 App. Cas. 1218, at p. 1278.
8 Clarke v. Dickson (1858), El. Bl. & El. 148, at p. 154; 120 E.R. 463, at p. 466 
(K.B.).
9 Rowland v. Divall, [1923] 2 K.B. 500 (C.A.). One o f the judges here based 
his reasoning on total failure o f consideration, but the other two (Bankes 
and Atkin L.JJ.) used this reasoning. This case may have been restricted 
by Linz v. Electric Wire Company o f  Palestine Ltd., [1948] A.C. 371, at 
p. 377 (P.C.).
10 Rowland v. Divall, [1923] 2 K.B. 500 (C.A.).
11 In fact, in this case, the benefits o f the resale had been reclaimed from 
the plaintiff by the man who purchased the car from him.
12 (1878), 3 App. Cas. 1218, at p. 1278.
13 Ibid., at p. 1278.
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And I think the practice has always been for a Court o f Equity to 
give this relief whenever, by the exercise o f its powers, it can do what 
is practically just, though it cannot restore the parties precisely to 
the state they were in before the contract.14
This is still the accepted dcctrine in equity, but it is now necessary 
to look at how liberally it has been applied.
Although a court o f equity cannot give damages, it forces the 
party making the m isrepresentation to give back all benefits he 
has received under the contract. These benefits can be direct benefits 
granted to the party or indirect benefits, in the form of obligations 
undertaken by the innocent party. Thus, while not giving damages 
for losses arising out o f the contract, the court can force the party 
making the misrepresentation to indemnify the innocent party 
against any obligations arising directly from  the contract (although 
they can do nothing about losses o r obligations arising merely as 
a result o f the contract).15
Lord Blackburn (as quoted above) said a court o f equity could 
“ make allowances for deterioration” . This phrase was applied in 
Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas Syndicate16 by the dissenting 
judge (Rigby L.J.), who said that deterioration could be accounted 
for by com pensation,17 and who would have allowed rescission. 
In that case the syndicate had sold a mining property to a company 
they had promoted, overvaluing the property. The property had 
been worked for over two years by the company, taking out large 
quantities o f nitrate and paying large dividends. The two judges 
giving the majority opinion, not allowing rescission, placed emphasis 
on the fact that there had been no fraud and both indicated they 
would have granted rescission had there been fraud.18 Thus, strong 
dicta supports the view that, where fraud is involved, almost any 
am ount o f “ deterioration” can be compensated. Adam v. New- 
bigging,19 in the House o f Lords, involved an innocent misrep­
resentation in the sale o f two-thirds shares in a partnership, where 
the partnership had become insolvent by the time the action was
14 Ibid., at pp. 1278-1279 (italics mine).
15 Adam v. Newbigging (1886), 34 Ch. D. 582 (C.A.); affirmed (1888), 13 App. 
Cas. 308 (H.L.): Senanyake v. Cheng [1966] A.C. 63, at p. 79 (P.C.). Both 
these cases involved innocent misrepresentations so would certainly apply 
in the case o f fraud.
16 [1899] 2 Ch. 392 (C.A.).
17 Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas Syndicate, [1899] 2 Ch. 392, at pp. 
456-458 (C.A.).
18 Ibid., at pp. 433-434, per Lindley M .R. and at pp. 463-464, per Collins L.J.
19 (1888), 13 App. Cas. 308 (H.L.).
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commenced. In that case Lord W atson said :2« “ Such deterioration, 
for it is nothing more, cannot stand in the way o f the respondent’s 
claim for m utual restitution.” Thus the concept o f deterioration 
has been useful in expanding the court’s discretion to make m utual 
restitution, allowing rescission.
The idea in Lord Blackburn’s judgm ent th a t has permitted 
the greatest discretion, however, is his reference to doing what 
is “ practically ju st” . Rigby L.J. seized on this phrase in the Lagunas21 
case in arriving at his judgm ent, and his statem ent o f the law (quoting 
Lord Blackburn in the Erlanger case) was approved by the House 
o f Lords in Spence v. Crawford.22 In this case, the pursuer (Spence) 
and the defender (Crawford) had been co-owners o f a company. 
In collusion with Richardson, an employee o f the company, Craw ­
ford had arranged for the balance sheet o f the com pany to show 
a loss in 1930. Using this as a lever, Crawford convinced Spence to 
sell his interest at about half value to Crawford. (In addition Spence 
gave up claims he had against the company for salary and director’s 
fees). In fact the company had shown a profit in 1930 and continued 
to be a profitable enterprise. The court held that the sale was induced 
by the fraud o f Crawford and Richardson working together. The 
case was complicated by subsequent developments. At the time o f 
the sale there had been 5850, £1 shares issued in the company, 
Spence and Crawford each holding half. By the time the action 
originated, some four years after the sale, the issued capital o f the 
company had been increased to £10,000 o f which Crawford and his 
wife held £7,500 and Richardson held £2,500. R ichardson had fallen 
out with Crawford and told Spence about the fraud. The court 
assumed that, if rescission were granted, Spence and Richardson 
would work together, thus depriving Crawford of any effective 
voice in the operation of the company. However, this was treated 
as being irrelevant. The last pertinent fact is that, under the contract, 
Crawford was to assume the responsibility for a guarantee Spence 
had given a bank in support o f the com pany’s debt. In fact, Craw ­
20 Adam  v. Newbigging (1888), 13 App. Cas. 308, at p. 323 (H.L.). In arriving 
at this conclusion, Lord Watson pointed out that the management o f the 
partnership had not changed and that, therefore, the insolvency must 
have been due to some inherent defect.
21 Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas Syndicate, [1899] 2 Ch. 392, at p. 
456 (C.A.).
22 [1939] 3 All E.R. 271, at pp. 279-280, per Lord Thankerton. In this case 
Lord Thankerton’s statements were concurred in by all members o f the 
court (five in all). Lord Wright made statements in addition to those o f  
Lord Thankerton, but only Lord Russel o f Killowen concurred with him. 
This is a case from Scotland, but it states the law in England is identical 
to that o f Scotland in this area.
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ford had never been called upon to pay under the guarantee, as the 
com pany had always succeeded in meeting its debts.
First the court pointed out that “ no stress is placed on whether 
the pursuer is . .  . restored” ,23 so the fact that he would get back 
less than the half-interest in the company that he sold was no bar 
to Spence obtaining rescission (actually his shares only constituted 
29.5% o f the issued stock o f the company). The next problem dealt 
with by the court is the fact that the circumstances had greatly 
changed, with the business being much less speculative and showing 
a steady and growing profit. This was said to make it impossible 
to return Crawford to his statu quo but the court said that the 
purchaser “ is not entitled, in bar o f restitution to found on dealings 
with the subject purchased, which he has been enabled by his fraud 
to carry ou t.”24 The court dismissed the problem o f Crawford 
losing control o f the company by saying he could hardly rely on 
his falling out with his particeps criminis25 as a bar. It disposed of 
the guarantee transaction on the basis that it cost Crawford nothing, 
indicating that a benefit received by a plaintiff, at no cost to the 
fraudulent party, will not be a bar to restitution. This appears to 
be the extreme position in England today in this area o f the law.
In summary, a fraudulent misrepresentation gives rise to a 
right o f rescission in the innocent party, subject to normal equitable 
defences, the possibility o f affirmation o f the contract, and the 
need for restitutio in integrum. In the case o f fraud, the doctrine 
o f restitutio in integrum will not be applied too literally, and liberal 
allowances can be made for “ deterioration” . The court will try to 
do what is “ practically ju st” and, in the words of Lord W right.26 
“ will exercise its jurisdiction to the full in order, if possible, to pre­
vent the defendant from enjoying the benefit o f his fraud” . However, 
if “ from his own act, o r from misfortune, it is impossible to make 
such restitution” ,27 it is too late for the innocent party to rescind.
The exact limits, within which the courts will be bound, cannot 
yet be accurately defined. Lord Wright has suggested that the courts
23 Spence v. Crawford, [1939] 3 All E.R. 271, at p. 279 (H.L.Sc.), but note 
that he is entitled to full restitution (see Adam v. Newbigging (1888),
13 App. Cas. 308 (H.L.) which he has agreed to waive in this case.
24 Spence v. Crawford, [1939] 3 All E.R. 271, at p. 288 (H.L.Sc.).
25 Ibid., at p. 281. The court went on to say that, if this had been a case o f  
innocent misrepresentation and the holdings in the company had been 
changed, it might have provided a bar.
26 Spence v. Crawford, [1939] 3 All E.R. 271, at p. 288 (H.L.Sc.).
27 Houldsworth v. City o f  Glasgow Bank (1880), 5 App. Cas. 317, at p. 388, 
(H.L.Sc.) per Lord Blackburn.
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can order restitution as long as “ the substantial identity o f the sub­
ject m atter o f the contract remains.”28 In the light o f the decided 
cases, such as Adam v. Newbigging,29 he would appear to con­
tem plate a liberal interpretation o f the words “ substantial identity” .30 
If Lord W right’s dictum is accepted as law, there should be no 
further attem pt at restrictive definition o f the limits within which 
the courts can exercise their discretion in cases o f fraud. Leaving 
the courts with a flexible doctrine will enable them to do justice 
on the facts o f an individual case, w ithout distorting any rules o f 
law too far. It is adm itted that this is not very satisfactory for lawyers 
who place great value on predictability, o r for judges, like Lord 
Sumner, who do not wish to be faced with the problem o f justice 
“ between man and m an” . However, this would be a suitable solution 
for the plaintiff who seeks the aid o f the law because he has been 
unjustly treated.
Innocent Misrepresentation 
Torrance v. Bolton31 establishes that “ There is no general rule 
that actual fraud is necessary to induce a Court o f Equity to rescind 
a contract o f sale” . However, in spite o f the wide words used there 
and in MacKenzie v. The Royal Bank o f  Canada,32 the scope o f the 
equitable remedy o f rescission has been extremely restricted in 
cases involving innocent m isrepresentation.33 At present the accepted 
statem ent o f the law seems to be that equity will not set aside an
28 Spence v. Crawford, [1939] 3 All E.R. 271, at p. 289 (H.L.Sc.).
29 (1886), 34 Ch. D . 582, affirmed (1888), 13 App. Cas. 308 (H.L.).
30 But he certainly didn’t intend the result obtained in Kupchak v. Dayson 
Holdings Ltd. (1965), 53 W.W.R. 65 (B.C.C.A.); see text at footnote 61.
31 (1872), L.R. 8 Ch. App. 118, headnote, supported in the judgment at 
p. 124.
32 [1934] A.C. 468, at p. 475 (P.C.) per Lord Atkin: “A contract o f guarantee, 
like any other contract, is liable to be avoided if induced by material mis­
representation o f existing fact, even if made innocently.” A recent Privy 
Council case, Senanayake v. Cheng, [1966] A.C. 63, has suggested that 
this case and Adam  v. Newbigging (1888), 13 App. Cas. 308 (H.L.), fall 
into a special class. (The Senanayake case has a fact situation very similar 
to the Adam  case.) There it is said that the contracts in these cases are 
neither executed nor executory, but contemplate a continuing relationship. 
In this type o f contract, rescission will be granted if restitutio in integrum 
is possible even if the misrepresentation is innocent. This would explain 
the fact that neither o f the older cases have resulted in a change in the 
general law, in spite o f their wide words and great authority.
33 In this essay, unless otherwise indicated by the context, all references to 
“ innocent misrepresentation” means “material innocent misrepresentation 
as to an existing fact.” To be effective as a cause o f action for rescission, 
the misrepresentation must always be material; and misrepresentations 
as to law or future fact will not provide grounds for rescission, in the 
absence of express contractual provisions to the contrary.
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executed contract because o f innocent m isrepresentation.34 Although 
this position has been doubted,35 there has been no decision clearly 
overruling it. Because o f this, when an action has been brought 
for rescission o f a contract on the ground o f innocent m isrepresenta­
tion, the courts have been reluctant to declare a contract executed. 
Mere execution o f the document does not result in the contract 
being executed.36 N either the passing of money under the contract37 
nor entering into possession o f property that is the subject m atter 
o f the contract38 necessarily bars the rescission o f the contract 
for innocent misrepresentation. Even assignment o f the signed 
contract to a third party, who then consented to a m inor change, 
was not held to bar rescission.39 (But the assignment had to be 
rescinded before judgm ent could be given granting rescission.) This 
broad interpretation often given to “ executed” has resulted in some 
anomalies. For example, how can a contract be executed when a 
truck is held for 5 days,40 but not be executed when shares are held 
for 5 months?41
Because the rule has been stated as: “ no rescission for an exe­
cuted contract based on an innocent misrepresentation,” and there 
is no problem o f restitutio in integrum where the contract is un­
executed, there has been little discussion o f the application o f the 
doctrine o f restitutio in integrum to cases o f innocent misrepresenta­
tion. As an alternative, it is submitted that the effect o f the English 
decisions is that rescission is, as a rule, allowed for innocent mis­
representation, but that the requirement of restitutio in integrum 
in all cases o f equitable rescission is applied more strictly than 
where fraud is found. While the courts have not used this term inol­
ogy, all the decisions in England would fit nicely into this doctrine.
34 Armstrong v. Jackson, [1917] 2 K.B. 822, at p. 825 (K .B.D.); Wilde v. 
Gibson (1848), H.L.C. 605, at p. 632: 9 E.R. 897 at p. 909; Angel v. Jay, 
[1911] 1 K.B. 666, at p. 671 (K .B.D.).
35 L eaf v. International Galleries, [1950] 1 All E.R. 693 (C.A.) per Denning 
L.J.; Solle v. Butcher, [1950] 1 K.B. 671, at p. 692 (C .A .) per Denning L.J.; 
G.C. Cheshire and C.H.S. Fifoot, The Law o f  Contract (6th ed., 1964), 
pp. 249-253.
36 Redgrave v. Hurd (1881), 20 Ch. D. 1 (C.A.); [Vauton v. Coppard, [1899]
1 Ch. 92 (Romer J.); Goldrei, Foucard and Sdn v. Sinclair and Russian 
Chamber o f  Commerce o f  London, [1918] 1 K.B. 180 (Pinckford L.J. and 
Sargant J., Bankes L.J. dissenting on another ground).
37 Ibid.
38 Redgrave v. Hurd (1881), 20 Ch. D. 1 (C.A.).
39 Abrams Steamship Company v. Westville Shipping Company, [1923] A.C. 
773 (H.L.).
40 Long v. Lloyd, [1958] 2 All E.R. 402 (C.A.).
41 In Re Metropolitan Coal Consumers' Association— Karberg's Case, [1892] 
3 Ch. 1 (C.A.).
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Besides accounting for the past cases, this would give the courts 
a much clearer guide for the future.
The Law in Canada
Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
N ot long after the Privy Council in Vrquhart v. MacPherson42 
applied the rule enunciated in Clarke v. Dickson, the general require­
ment of restitutio in the common law was accepted by the Court 
o f Appeal o f Ontario. In adopting the doctrine, A rm our J. gave 
a unique explanation o f its m eaning:43
It is trite law and plain equity that one cannot elect to rescind 
a contract for fraud, keep what he has got under it as the consideration 
for what he has given under it, and sue for what he has given as the 
consideration for what he has got; he must first give back what he 
has got as the consideration for what he has given, before he can sue 
for what he has given as the consideration for what he has got. This 
is what is meant when it is said that there can be no rescission without 
restitution.
In spite of this exposition of the law, the doctrine received general 
acceptance in C anada.44 Thus, as a general rule, a party induced 
by fraud to enter into a contract has a right to have it rescinded 
if he can make restitution o f benefits received under the contract.
In 1913, the O ntario Court o f Appeal accepted45 the statements 
of Lord Blackburn in the Erlanger4b case as establishing the doctrine 
to  be followed in equity to accomplish restitutio in integrum. In 
the case then before the court a woman had bought a car, having 
been told it was a new 1913 model. In fact, the car had been in an 
accident and had been rebuilt at the factory. Although the woman 
had used the car for four m onths before discovering the fraud 
(at which time she immediately returned the car), the court adopted47 
the statement from the Lagunas48 case:
If substantially compensation can be made, rescission with 
compensation is ex debito justitiae.
42 (1878), 3 App. Cas. 831 (P.C.), adopting the doctrine o f Clarke v. Dickson 
(see text at footnote 7.).
43 Fraser v. M'Lean (1881), 46 U.C.Q.B. 302, at p. 329 (C.A.).
44 See, for example, Waterloo Motors Ltd. v. Flood, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 762, 
at p. 771 (N.B.C .A.); Carter v. Gotland, [1937] 4 D.L.R. 531 (Ont. C.A.).
45 Addison v. Ottawa Auto and Taxi Co. (1913), 16 D.L.R. 318, at p. 324 
(Ont. C.A.).
46 Erlanger v. The New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1878), 3 App. Cas. 1218, at 
pp. 1278-1279 (H.L.).
47 Addison v. Ottawa Auto and Taxi Co. (1913), 16 D.L.R. 318, at p. 324 
(Ont. C.A.).
48 Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas Syndicate, [1899] 2 Ch. 392, at pp. 
456-457 (C.A.) per Rigby, L.J.
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and ordered rescission. Note that here the court was merely com ­
pensating for deterioration, and the subject m atter o f the contract 
as an  entity was returned.
On the other hand, in another case, a man bought a car, being 
induced by fraudulent representation that the car would be insured 
against fire by the seller while the car was being paid for. The car 
was destroyed by fire after he had used it eleven m onths. Because 
the car had been used eleven m onths and had been destroyed by 
fire, and so could not be returned, the court held that restitutio in 
integrum was impossible and refused to grant rescission.49
Finally in another case, the car had been driven some 13,000 
miles and the court allowed rescission, with payment o f com pensa­
tion, because it had been fraudulently misrepresented as a new car. 
(In fact, someone else had owned it for twelve days.)50
The only way these three cases can be reconciled is on the 
basis that in two o f them the subject m atter was returned in a 
deteriorated condition, whereas in the other, the subject m atter had 
been destroyed. Thus it would appear that, in C anada, a great deal 
o f deterioration will be allowed where there is fraud, but, to have 
rescission, the subject m atter must be capable o f being returned 
as an entity. However, two exceptions to this general rule appear 
from the cases:
(a) where the goods transferred under the contract are intended 
for use in trade, and
(b) where the loss o r destruction o f the goods is owing to 
the fault o f the fraudulent party.
Two O ntario cases illustrate the first exception. In the first,51 
the plaintiff bought a retail store having been told that it did busi­
ness to the value o f $3600. per month. In fact the turnover was 
only $1600. per m onth and, after three m onths, the plaintiff sued 
for rescission. A lthough the court found fraud, they were faced 
with a difficult task in trying to achieve restitutio in integrum. The 
solution they adopted (in a unanim ous decision o f the Court o f 
Appeal) can be seen by quoting from the judgm ent:52
. . .  ‘practical justice’ can best be satisfied and can well be satisfied 
by having an account taken o f the assets o f the business at the time
49 Waterloo M otors Ltd. v. Flood, [1913] 1 D.L.R. 762 (N.B.C.A.). Damages 
were awarded for deceit in this case.
50 Wiebe v. Butchart's Motors, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 838 (B.C.C.A.). In fact, one 
of the judges allowing rescission in this case treated the misrepresentation 
as innocent.
51 Carter v. Gotland, [1937] 4 D.L.R. 513 (Ont. C.A.).
52 Ibid., at p. 517.
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o f the rescission and at the time o f the acquisition o f the business, 
just allowance being made for the expense o f carrying on the business 
and for any depreciation that may have taken place.
This obviously goes beyond mere com pensation for deterioration, 
unless it can be said tha t the “ business’ ’as an entity is being returned.
In another case, sixty dozen cigar lighters were sold to a whole­
saler on the basis o f the misrepresentation that no o ther wholesaler 
in the area had any. After selling thirteen dozen, the falsehood was 
discovered and rescission was attem pted by offering back the re­
maining forty-seven dozen accompanied by payment o f the lighters 
sold. The court allowed rescission on this basis saying:53 “ full 
restitutio in integrum is not necessary in a case o f this sort, where 
many articles are sold with the intention that they be immediately 
put in trade and resold.”
The second exception is illustrated in Hines v. McCallum54 
where a contract was made for the sale o f land, with the purchaser 
taking immediate possession. One encumbrance, a mortgage, had 
been declared by the vendor, but others had not. After raising one 
crop (that failed) and the passage o f some nine m onths, the purchaser 
found out about the additional encumbrances and declared his inten­
tion to rescind. Before the rescission, the land and the chattels on 
it had been seized as a result o f the encumbrances. Finding fraud, 
the court allowed rescission because the loss o f the property was 
the fault o f the vendor in not paying off the encumbrances. This 
application o f the law has been supported by at least one other case 
in C anada55 and has also been supported in England;56 so the 
principle, that the fraudulent party cannot cite changes owing to 
his own fault in bar o f  rescission, is proably valid.
A recent case in British Colum bia, Kupchak v. Dayson Holdings 
Co.,51 indicates a radical change in the application o f the doctrine 
o f restitutio in integrum in equitable rescission in Canada if it is 
followed. There Kupchak had transferred two separate properties 
to Dayson Holdings Ltd. in exchange for shares in a motel and a 
$64,500. mortgage. The transaction had been induced by fraud. 
Following the transaction, Dayson Holdings Ltd. transferred an 
undivided half-interest in one o f the properties to a third party 
and, in conjunction with the third party, erected a large modern
53 Trans-Canada Trading Co. Lim ited  v. M . Loeb Limited, [1947] O.W .N. 432, 
at p. 436 (Ont. High Ct.).
54 [1925] 2 D .L.R . 403 (Man. Dysart J.).
55 Kupchak v. Dayson Holdings Ltd. (1965), 53 W.W.R. 65 (B.C.C.A.).
56 Spence v. Crawford, [1939] 3 AU E.R. 271 (H.L.Sc.).
57 (1965), 53 W.W.R. 65 (B.C.C.A.).
76 U.N.B. LA W  JOURNAL
apartm ent building on the property. In addition, the property was 
subject to mortgages o f a total value o f $575,000. The court granted 
rescission ordering cancellation o f the mortgage for $64,500., return 
o f  the unaltered property (with an account for all profits, a change 
in the mortgage, etc.), return o f the motel shares (with an accounting 
for all dividends) and payment by Dayson Holdings Ltd. o f  the value 
o f  the property that could not be returned (with interest dating from 
the time of the transaction). It is in justifying this last step that 
the court introduced a radical new idea. Here they were not merely 
compensating for deterioration with money, but allowed money to 
substitute completely for property transferred under the transaction.
In a rather sketchy justification o f this step, Davey J.A .,58 
began by quoting Lord W right as follows:59
. . .  in the case o f fraud the court will exercise its jurisdiction 
to the full in order, if possible, to prevent the defendent from enjoying 
the benefit o f his fraud at the expense o f the innocent plaintiff. . .  
Certainly in a case o f fraud the court will do its best to unravel the 
complexities o f any particular case, which may in some cases involve 
adjustments on both sides.
He then went on to say that . .  equity’s power to remove inequities 
resulting from rescission and deficiencies in restitution by com pensa­
tion, account or indemnity must be kept in m ind” .60 After conced­
ing that this was not a payment arising out o f equity’s traditional 
powers o f account and indemnity, he went on to say:61
Rescission is an equitable remedy and, in my opinion, equity 
has the same power, operating on the conscience o f the parties, to order 
one to pay compensation to the other in order to effect substantial 
restitution under a decree for rescission, as it has to order one party 
to pay money on account, or by way o f indemnity. The jurisdiction 
to order compensation is, I think, inherent in the decree for rescission 
and incidental to it, and flows from what Lord Blackburn described 
in the Erlanger case as equity’s power to do what is practically just, 
though it cannot restore the parties precisely to the state they were 
in before the contract.
He also said that, in any case, com pensation itself was a remedy 
traditionally used by equity as a court o f conscience acting “ /'« 
personam” .6 -
58 Davey, J.A., with Norris J.A. concurring, delivered the majority judgment. 
Shepherd J.A. dissented saying that in acting under the transaction for 
five years, the plaintiff had elected not to rescind.
59 Spence v. Crawford, [1939] 3 All E.R. 271, at pp. 288-289 (H.L.Sc.).
60 Kupchak v. Dayson Holdings Ltd. (1965), 53 W.W.R. 65, at p. 68 (B.C.C.A.).
61 Ibid., at p. 69.
62 Ibid., at p. 70. In support o f this he cited Nocton v. Ashburton (Lord), [1914] 
A.C. 932, at p. 946 (H.L.) per  Lord Haldane.
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Thus, if this case is accepted generally throughout C anada, the 
general restriction forbidding rescission when the subject m atter 
as an entity cannot be returned, will be removed. As a result the 
courts will have a very wide discretionary power to order rescission 
in cases o f fraud. Since the plaintiff might still forfeit his right o f 
action through affirmation o f  the contract after discovering the 
misrepresentation, this additional discretion would not be so wide 
as to be objectionable. It would have the advantage, seen in this 
case, o f allowing rescission where an innocent third party has 
acquired rights that forbid restitution in specie.
Innocent Misrepresentation
There are few decisions in C anada where rescission has been 
granted on the basis o f innocent misrepresentation. In Cole v. Pope, 
the Supreme C ourt o f C anada said th a t63 “ mere innocent misrep­
resentation will not w arrant the rescission o f an executed contract 
for the sale o f an interest in land.” A lthough this case specifically 
dealt with a sale o f  an “ interest in land” , the reluctance o f the 
C anadian courts to grant rescission o f  any executed contract is 
probably based on the case. The judgm ent was clarified by the 
Supreme Court in Redican v. N e s b i t t where it was stated that an 
innocent m isrepresentation inducing an error in substance would 
justify the rescission o f an executed contract. This is the law today 
in Canada in relation to an executed contract, but the flexibility 
o f the courts has been increased by giving a generous meaning to 
error in substance. Thus a thresher with insufficient power to handle 
a heavy field o f grain,65 a car one year older than was represented,66 
and a truck two years older than was represented67 have all been 
considered substantial enough errors to justify rescission for in­
nocent misrepresentation.
However, there remains the necessity for restitutio in integrum, 
even if the contract can otherwise be rescinded. This requirement is, 
as a general rule, quite strict. Thus in a purchase o f land and 
chattels, where some o f the chattels (cattle) had been sold, there 
could be no restitutio in integrum although the cattle represented
63 (1898), 29 S.C.R. 291, at p. 295. This was a unanimous opinion o f the 
court.
64 [1924] S.C.R. 135. See also Shortt v. MacLennan and MacLennan (1958),
16 D.L.R. (2d) 161 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
65 The Cushman M otor Works o f  Canada Limited v. Laing, [1920] S.C.R. 649.
66 O'Flaherty v. McKinlay (1951), 30 M.P.R. 172 (Nfld. C.A.).
67 F. & B. Transport Ltd. v. White Truck Sales Manitoba Ltd. (1965), 51 W .W .R . 
124 (Man. C.A.).
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a very small portion o f the transaction as a whole.68 However, in 
the same case, it was pointed out that, if what was received under 
the contract can be returned in specie, any deterioration in it can 
be compensated at the discretion o f the court. As a result, in recent 
decisions the use o f a truck for nine m onths69 and the use o f a car 
for 7000 miles70 have each been compensated for as deterioration, 
allowing rescission. In the last case Dunfield J. quoted71 Lam ont 
J.A .72 as follows:
The rule is that where the representee has lost or destroyed the 
subject matter o f the contract, or so dealt with it is to produce an 
entire alteration in its physical, commercial or legal character, quality 
or substance as distinct from mere depreciation, decay or deterioration 
in the ordinary course o f events, the representee is not entitled to 
rescission . . .
Backed by the authority  o f two provincial courts o f appeal, this is 
probably a good statem ent o f the law defining allowable deteriora­
tion.
In summary, rescission is available for innocent misrepresenta­
tion in Canada if a contract is unexecuted, or if only money has 
passed,73 or if the contract is executed but the misrepresentation 
caused an error in substantialibus. Rescission on these grounds will 
only be allowed if restitutio in integrum is possible. To have restitutio 
in integrum, the property transferred must be returned in specie, 
although extensive allowances can be made for deterioration.
68 Thurston v. Streilen, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 724 (Man. K.B.D.). In this judgment 
Montague J. pointed out that in the U.S. and in France, if a small portion 
cannot be returned, this is no bar to rescission if the impossibility o f  return 
arose before the misrepresentation was discovered. This seems more logical 
than the Canadian position as set out here.
69 F. & B. Transport Ltd. v. White Truck Sales Manitoba Ltd. (1965), 51 W.W.R. 
124 (Man. C.A.).
70 O'Flaherty v. McKinlay (1951), 30 M.P.R. 172 (Nfld. C.A.).
71 Ibid., at pp. 188-189.
72 Gearhart v. Kraatz (1918), 40 D.L.R. 26, at p. 29 (Sask. C.A.). Lamont J.A. 
here cites Halsbury as his authority.
73 For situations where deposits have been ordered returned see: Comeller 
v. Billinkoff ( 1954), 62 Man. R. 35 (Williams C.J.Q.B.); Stubbs v. Downey 
and Downey (1957), 8 D .L.R . (2d) 720 (Ont. C.A.); and Guest v. Beecroft, 
Beecroft and F. N. Cabeldu Ltd. (1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 657 (B.C. Sup. Ct.). 
In the last case the purchaser had painted the kitchen in the house that 
was to be transferred, but MacFarlane J. merely said that restitution need 
not be “precisely” to the former position quoting the Erlonger case, (1878),
3 App. Cas. 1218, at p. 1278, per Lord Blackburn.
